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Controlled Foreign Company Legislation in New Zealand
Andrew M.C. Smith and Adrian J. Sawyer
25.1. Characteristics of New Zealand’s CFC legislation
New Zealand enacted controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation in 
1988 along with complementary legislation covering the taxation of for-
eign investment funds (FIFs) and offshore trusts. The CFC rules came into 
effect in several stages with the rst part targeting companies resident in a 
list of nil or low-tax jurisdictions from 1 April 1988, while, for companies 
resident in other states, from 1 April 1993.
The initial impetus for the introduction of the CFC legislation was signi-
cant avoidance arising through the use of offshore companies located in 
low- and nil tax jurisdictions after New Zealand removed long-standing 
foreign exchange controls in 1985. These exchange controls had been in 
place since 1933 and prevented New Zealand residents from converting 
local currency into foreign exchange for offshore investments (equity shares 
and real estate) except in certain limited circumstances. Once these controls 
were suddenly lifted in 1985, New Zealand companies and high net-worth 
individuals were quick to put in place tax avoidance arrangements involving 
companies and trusts located in offshore tax havens such as the Cook Islands 
(a former New Zealand dependent territory), Hong Kong and the Channel 
Islands, among others. In the 1987 Budget1 delivered on 18 June 1987, it 
was announced that CFC rules would be introduced as an “anti-tax haven” 
measure. At this stage, it appeared such rules would target New Zealand 
residents who held controlling interests in companies in low- or nil tax 
jurisdictions in respect of passive income only. The drafting of the CFC 
rules was referred to a consultative committee for further advice.
In December 1987, the government released a consultative document2 on 
its proposed international tax reforms as part of a wide-reaching economic 
statement.3 The international tax proposals contained in this document were 
1. R. Douglas; 1987 Budget, Government Print Wellington, June 1987.
2. R. Douglas, Consultative Document on International Tax Reform, Wellington, 
Dec. 1987.
3. R. Douglas, Government Economic Statement, 17 Dec. 1987.
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much broader than initially proposed and the CFC rules that were proposed 
were no longer targeted just at passive income derived by companies in tax 
havens through companies in tax havens, but to eliminate deferral of New 
Zealand tax on income earned by all offshore entities controlled by New 
Zealand residents. These rules were to be supplemented by FIF rules which 
would apply to interests in offshore portfolio entities and revised tax rules 
applying to offshore trusts. Thus, the policy objectives underpinning the 
CFC rules underwent a signicant shift from when they were announced in 
the 1987 Budget until the release of the consultative document from being 
a targeted anti-avoidance provision to one that extended residence-based 
taxation to holdings in all offshore entities eliminating any deferral. This 
extension of a proposal into something much broader and comprehensive 
was a trend in New Zealand’s tax reform programme throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. It is open to speculation that this was a deliberate manipula-
tion by public ofcials to get the government committed to undertake a tax 
reform (i.e. to deal with tax avoidance using tax havens), which appeared 
perfectly reasonable and necessary, then manipulate the reform process to 
achieve something much broader that may not have been sellable to the 
government in the rst instance. The resulting CFC rules that were enacted 
were part of a much wider package (including complementary FIF rules for 
which there were non-controlling interests in non-resident entities and for 
offshore trusts) which also involved the introduction of dividend imputation4
and the taxation of intercompany dividends from foreign companies when 
previously they had been exempt.
From when the New Zealand CFC rules were rst introduced, New Zealand 
has attributed income of offshore companies to their New Zealand share-
holders as if they had earned income directly under what is termed a “branch 
equivalent” basis.5 This effectively is the same as if the veil of incorporation 
of the CFC was lifted.
4. One key objective sought from the introduction of dividend imputation (which was 
part of the series of international tax reforms) was to create an incentive for companies 
to pay tax in New Zealand instead of offshore. Under the dividend imputation rules, any 
foreign tax credits that a New Zealand company receives in respect of any foreign-sourced 
income they derive cannot be passed on to shareholders as imputation credits.
5. Note that New Zealand does not exempt the income of any offshore branch (i.e. 
PE) and it has always been included as part of a resident’s worldwide income.
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A “controlled foreign company” is dened6 as a foreign company7 for which 
there is either:
(a) a group of ve or fewer New Zealand residents whose total control 
interests in a foreign (non-resident) company are more than 50% in any 
one of four tests; or
(b) a single New Zealand resident holds a control interest of 40% or more 
unless, at the same time, the person’s control interest is less than or 
equal to a control interest in the same category held by another person; 
and that other person is not a New Zealand tax resident and not associ-
ated with the single New Zealand shareholder; or
(c) there is a group of ve or fewer New Zealand residents who can control 
the exercise of shareholder decision-making rights for the company 
and, as a result, control the company’s affairs.
Thus, the concept of a “control interest” is central to the denition of a 
CFC. It is dened in section EX 2(1) and (2) as one that arises in each of 
four separate categories:
(a) shareholdings in the foreign company; or
(b) shareholder decision-making rights for the foreign company; or
(c) rights to receive income from the foreign company; or
(d) rights to receive distributions of the company’s net assets.
The calculation of “control interests” is explained in section EX 3(1) as the 
direct control interests held by the taxpayer and persons associated with the 
taxpayer (whether resident or not)8 plus indirect control interests held by the 
taxpayer and persons associated with them (again whether a New Zealand 
resident or not). Indirect control interests arise when the interests in the 
target CFC are held through a chain of companies. When a person has direct 
control interests of more than 50% in an intermediate company for deter-
mining the control interests of the nal company, the direct control interests 
of the intermediate company are attributed to the nal shareholders.
A company will be treated as a CFC for the whole accounting period if any 
one of the control tests is met on any day in the accounting period. This 
will not result in excessive attribution of income if the shareholder has 
only held shares in the CFC for part of the accounting period as the period 
6. NZ: Income Tax Act 2007, sec. EX(1) [hereinafter ITA 2007], Primary Sources 
IBFD.
7. A “foreign company” is dened in section YA 1 of the ITA 2007 as a non-resident 
company or a resident company that is treated as a non-resident company under a double 
tax agreement.
8. See sec. EX 4 ITA 2007.
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of ownership is taken into account when the amount of CFC income to be 
attributed to the shareholder is calculated.9
The New Zealand CFC rules are applied individually to interests in each 
non-resident company including lower-tier subsidiaries of CFCs. They 
apply not only to New Zealand companies with offshore subsidiaries but 
also to individuals with direct interests in non-resident companies. When 
interests in non-resident companies and other entities do not fall within the 
denition of a CFC (or are below the 10% threshold for income attribution), 
the FIF rules apply. These are explained in section 25.3.
Once a CFC exists, income from that CFC interest will be attributed to the 
New Zealand resident shareholders according to each resident shareholder’s 
income interest.10 Income interests are dened in a similar way to control 
interests with the key difference being that the income of CFC sharehold-
ings held indirectly are calculated by multiplying through the chain of 
companies without the step-up for 50% of more interests in intermediate 
companies, which is done with the control interests test.11 The interests 
of associated persons are not included as they will be taxed separately in 
respect of their CFC interests.
The New Zealand CFC rules have never dened a CFC on the basis of the 
tax rates applying to the CFC, although offshore company tax rates were 
partly considered in 1992 when revising which countries would be placed 
on the “grey list” of non-attributing CFCs. CFCs have always been dened 
using the control interest concept. When the CFC rules were rst introduced, 
there were very few exemptions from the requirement to attribute CFC in-
come. The only exemption offered was for CFCs resident in one of seven 
countries, namely, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States that were known as “grey-list” countries.12
The justication for this “grey list” was compliance cost grounds. These 
states had similar rates of tax to New Zealand’s and had already adopted 
similar base protection measures so that, after the granting of foreign tax 
credits, very little additional income tax would be payable in New Zealand. 
9. See sec. EX 17 ITA 2007.
10. See secs. EX 8 and EX 9 ITA 2007. Non-resident shareholders that were aggre-
gated as associated persons under the control test do not have income attributed to them 
in respect of the CFC interests – sec. EX 16(2) ITA 2007.
11. See sec. EX 10 ITA 2007.
12. After the “grey list” was introduced, it was later revised by removing France and 
adding Norway and Spain; the latter two countries entered protests at being left off the 
list on the grounds that their tax regimes were not sufciently robust against international 
tax avoidance.
467
Characteristics of New Zealand’s CFC legislation
Hence, there was little point in imposing signicant compliance costs on 
New Zealand shareholders if little tax would be collected. No exemption 
was provided for active income earned by CFCs in any other country, which 
placed New Zealand-based companies at a signicant disadvantage com-
pared to their foreign competitors in respect of foreign operations.
The CFC rules underwent a substantial revision in 2009 when an active 
income exemption was introduced that is comparable to the one provided 
in Australia’s CFC rules. However, at the same time, the “grey list” of coun-
tries where CFCs were not subject to income attribution was reduced to 
just one country, namely, Australia.13 Thus, CFCs in countries such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Canada are now potentially subject 
to income attribution in respect of any passive income derived if they do not 
meet the active income exemption.
To qualify for an active income exemption, the CFC (termed a “non-attrib-
uting active CFC”) must derive less than 5% of its total gross income from 
passive sources (interest, royalties, dividends, rental and lease income). This 
test can be applied using accounts prepared using IFRS or, in other circum-
stances, foreign tax accounts with some adjustments (such as for capital 
gains) to reect New Zealand tax accounting rules.14 It is important to note 
that this exemption hinges on the categories of incomes that are dened as 
passive; any other amounts of income are assumed to be active.
The second exemption from the requirement to attribute CFC income is for 
“non-attributing Australian CFCs”, which are dened in section EX 22(1) 
of the ITA 2007. They are Australian companies which, at all times during 
the accounting period, are:
(a) tax residents of Australia (under Australian law and not treated as non-
resident under any Australian double tax agreement (DTA)) and subject 
to income tax on their income; and
(b) their income tax liability has not been reduced by either an exemption 
from or in respect of income derived from business activities carried on 
outside Australia or any relief or allowance in respect of offshore bank-
ing units; and
(c) is not a unit trust unless it is one taxed as a company.
Broadly, if a CFC is resident and subject to tax in Australia, it is a non-
attributing Australian CFC and is exempt from attribution under the New 
13. See sec. EX 22 ITA 2007.
14. See secs. EX 21C-21E ITA 2007. 
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Zealand CFC rules if the New Zealand shareholders have an income inter-
est of 10% or more.15 If the Australian exemption does not apply, then one 
needs to determine whether to use tax measures of income or accounting 
measures of income to check if the CFC qualies for the active business 
exemption. However, even if a non-attributing Australian CFC exists, the 
New Zealand shareholders may still have attributed CFC income or attrib-
uted CFC loss if the CFC derives personal services income.16 Such income 
is always attributable.
For an Australian CFC to be “subject to tax”, it requires one of two things. 
Firstly, the CFC can itself be subject to Australian income tax. Alternatively, 
the CFC can be part of a consolidated group for Australian tax purposes if 
that consolidated group (through the “head company”) is itself subject to 
Australian income tax. Importantly, it is not sufcient for a person with an 
income interest in the CFC to be subject to Australian tax on the CFC’s 
income.
An Australian CFC will not qualify to be a non-attributing one for New 
Zealand tax purposes if its liability for Australian income tax has been 
reduced by an exemption from or reduction of income tax for certain off-
shore business income. In these circumstances, the Australian CFC will 
be subject to an income attribution on the same basis as a CFC resident 
in other countries and still be eligible for the active income exemption if 
their passive income is below the 5% threshold. If ineligible for the active 
income exemption, all passive income derived by the CFC must be attrib-
uted. If a non-attributing Australian CFC holds an interest in another CFC, 
the Australian exemption will not automatically apply to that other CFC. 
This is because the other CFC is effectively treated as being held by the 
resident holders of interests in the rst CFC rather than by the rst CFC.17
The eligibility of the other CFC for the New Zealand CFC exemption must 
be separately assessed.
If a non-attributing Australian CFC holds an interest in a FIF, the Australian 
exemption will not automatically apply to that other FIF. Again, this is 
because the FIF is effectively treated as being held by the resident holders 
of interests in the CFC rather than by the CFC itself.18
15. See sec. EX 22 ITA 2007.
16. See sec. EX 20B(3)(h) ITA 2007.
17. See secs. EX 10 and EX 21(13)(c) ITA 2007.
18. See sec. EX 58 ITA 2007.
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If a CFC is ineligible for either the active income or Australian company 
exemptions, income must be attributed to New Zealand resident sharehold-
ers but only in respect of the passive income earned by the CFC. For income 
attribution to occur, the person must have an income interest of 10% or more 
in a CFC.19 Under section EX 18, a person’s attributed CFC income for an 
accounting period is dened to be:
income interest x net attributable CFC income or loss
Income interests are to be calculated on a quarterly basis although taxpay-
ers have an option to use a weighted-average basis which is likely to be 
more attractive if there have been variations in their shareholding within 
a quarter.20
The attributable CFC income or loss is calculated under section EX 20B. 
It is a complex calculation taking into account the passive income of the 
CFC with adjustments for funding costs. Additionally, there is an interest 
allocation rule that applies under sections EX 20C and EX 20D to allocate 
interest expense against the CFC’s income and the New Zealand share-
holder’s income.21
In calculating the tax payable by a New Zealand resident shareholder in 
respect of attributed CFC income, a foreign tax credit is allowed for income 
tax paid by the CFC when it derives that income including any withhold-
ing taxes. However, any credits arising under tax sparing provisions of a 
DTA will not be granted to the New Zealand shareholder on attributed CFC 
income.22 The country in which the foreign tax has been paid and which 
a foreign tax credit is sought must be the same country from which the 
attributable CFC income is derived. This restriction is consistent with the 
New Zealand foreign tax credit rules whereby foreign tax credits are calcu-
lated on a source-by-source, country-by-country basis.23 The amount of the 
foreign tax credit cannot exceed the New Zealand tax payable by the New 
19. If their income interest is less than 10%, while no attribution occurs under the CFC 
rules, they are subject to income attribution under the FIF rules – refer to section 25.3.
20. See sec. EX 17 ITA 2007.
21. Under section DB 8 of the ITA 2007, New Zealand companies are entitled to a 
deduction for nancing costs of acquiring shares in a subsidiary company provided there 
is at least 66% or greater common ownership. No nexus is required to be established 
between the interest expense of any income produced by the subsidiary and, in any case, 
intercompany dividends from non-resident companies are exempt from New Zealand tax.
22. Refer to NZ: Court of Appeal [NZCA], 8 Mar. 2018, Lin v. Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, [2018] NZCA 38, (2018) 28 NZTC 23-052. See also NZ: NZCA, 8 Mar. 2018,
Lin v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD.
23. See subpart LJ ITA 2007.
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Zealand shareholder on their attributed CFC income. If there are excess 
foreign tax credits in respect of attributed CFC income, they can be carried 
forward to the next income year subject to a shareholding continuity test if 
the New Zealand shareholder is a company.24 This is the only instance for 
which excess foreign tax credits can be carried forward under the ITA 2007; 
for other types of foreign-sourced income, any excess foreign tax credits are 
forfeited. The original reason for this carry-forward was to allow for timing 
differences when there was no active income exemption prior to 2009 and 
the active income of most CFCs had to be attributed.
Any loss derived by a CFC for which income attribution would otherwise 
occur is attributable to the New Zealand resident shareholders according 
to the fraction of their income interest but cannot be directly offset against 
their other sources of income. Instead, it can be only offset against attrib-
uted CFC income from other CFCs (and certain FIF interests) in the same 
jurisdiction in the same year. Otherwise, the attributed CFC losses must 
be carried forward to future income years subject to a minimum of 49% 
shareholding continuity being maintained in the CFC. Given that the CFC 
income is attributable on a “branch-equivalent” basis, it is inconsistent and 
inequitable for losses to be quarantined on this basis when losses derived 
by a New Zealand resident from an ordinary offshore branch (or PE) can be 
directly offset against other income.
The New Zealand CFC rules are applied individually to interests in each 
non-resident company including lower-tier subsidiaries of CFCs. They 
apply not only to New Zealand companies with offshore subsidiaries but 
also to individuals with direct interests in non-resident companies. When 
interests in non-resident companies and other entities do not fall within the 
denition of a CFC (or are below the 10% threshold for income attribution), 
the FIF rules apply. These are explained in section 25.3.
25.2. Implementation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive
As New Zealand is not an EU country, these articles of the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive are not relevant.
24. This continuity requirement is the same as for the carry-forward of company tax 
losses – namely, 49% or greater continuity of shareholding.
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25.3. Special CFC rules
New Zealand’s CFC rules apply to all non-resident companies that meet 
the control tests explained in the rst section of this chapter. There are no 
special rules for particular types of CFCs apart from the non-attribution 
of income from certain Australian CFCs. One notable feature of the New 
Zealand CFC rules are the complementary FIF rules.25 They apply to all 
interests held by New Zealand residents in offshore entities that fall outside 
the CFC rules because one of the control tests is not met (even if the inves-
tor’s income interest is above 10%) or in respect of CFCs when a resident’s 
income interest is below 10%.
A FIF is an offshore investment that is:26
– a foreign company;
– a foreign unit trust;
– a foreign superannuation scheme (prior to 1 April 2014);
– a FIF superannuation interest; or
– an insurer under a foreign life insurance policy.
One of the major issues for attributing income from a FIF is that the New 
Zealand investor usually has limited scope to obtain detailed information 
from the FIF about its earnings in order to undertake income attribution in a 
way that is comparable to CFCs. Therefore, proxies are adopted to attribute 
FIF income in the absence of such detailed information. Five methods are 
potentially available to investors to determine the amount of FIF income to 
be attributed:27
(i) attributable FIF method;
(ii) comparable value method (“mark-to-market”);
(iii) deemed rate of return method;
(iv) fair dividend rate method; and
(v) cost method.
Under all of the ve above methods, any dividends or cash distributions 
received are ignored for tax purposes.
Investors do not necessarily have an unfettered choice among the ve meth-
ods as not all methods can be used in all situations. The attributable FIF 
method is only available to non-portfolio holdings (interests of 10% or 
25. See secs. EX 28-EX 73 ITA 2007.
26. See sec. YA 1 ITA 2007.
27. See sec. EX 44 ITA 2007.
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more) and provides an active income exemption similar to the one offered 
under the CFC rules when the offshore company does not qualify as a CFC. 
The calculation of income under this option is extremely complex.28
The comparative value is “mark-to-market” and can only be applied when 
there are reliable market values available such as with listed companies. 
This method taxes unrealized capital gains and is the least attractive of 
the ve methods, especially since New Zealand does not comprehensively 
tax capital gains on a realized basis for interests in New Zealand resident 
companies.29
The deemed rate of return method can only be used in rare circumstances 
after 2011 to interests in “certain non-ordinary shares” such as xed rate 
shares and non-participating redeemable shares.30
The fair dividend method deems a 5% return on the market value of an 
investment at the beginning of each income year that starts on 1 April. If 
the investment was acquired during the year, no income is attributed in the 
rst year unless sold within the same income year, which requires complex 
calculations. For individuals and family trusts, if the actual return (dividends 
plus capital gains realized and unrealized) is below 5%, the actual return is 
subject to tax. Managed funds are taxed on the deemed 5% return with no 
option for a lower amount if actual returns are low or negative.31 While this 
method is the most commonly adopted for accounting for FIF interests, it 
can produce unusual outcomes. No taxable income is derived during the 
year an investment is acquired as there is a nil value at the start of the year. 
However, income is deemed to arise during the year an investment is sold.
The cost method is a variation on the fair dividend method and applies 
when there are no readily available market values. In this case, the cost of 
the investment is used with a 5% uplift each year (compounding) on the 
assumption that the real value of the investment will increase each year. A 
5% deemed return is the FIF attributed income on the compounding cost 
gure each year.32
There are a range of exemptions from income attribution under the FIF rules 
with the most important being in respect of interests in most ASX listed 
28. See sec. EX 50 ITA 2007.
29. See sec. EX 51 ITA 2007.
30. See sec. EX 55 ITA 2007.
31. See secs. EX 52-54 ITA 2007.
32. See sec. EX 56 ITA 2007.
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Australian resident companies. Another is a de minimis exemption for FIF 
interests that have a cost in aggregate less than NZD 50,000.33 There are 
further exemptions for certain listed Australian unit trusts, certain venture 
capital companies migrating to specied countries and interests in foreign 
superannuation schemes.
A second series of special rules concern portfolio investment entities (PIEs) 
that are vehicles for collective investments. These entities include man-
aged funds that invest the contributions from investors in different types of 
investments. PIEs came into existence on 1 October 2007. PIEs cannot use 
the active income exemption for their foreign investments as, if they could, 
then there would be no New Zealand tax when PIEs distributed active in-
come to their shareholders. Consequently, all CFC interests held by a PIE 
are deemed not to be CFC interests.34 However, the foreign company will 
continue to be CFC, but the PIE will use the FIF rules as opposed to the 
CFC rules. Other persons with CFC interests in the CFC will continue to 
use the CFC rules.
In addition to the CFC and FIF rules, a third set of rules exist when the 
income is from a foreign trust.35 A trust will be a foreign trust if none of its 
settlors have been resident in New Zealand since the later of these dates:
– 17 December 1987; or
– the date the trust was rst settled.
A trust will cease to be a foreign trust if it makes any distribution after a 
settlor becomes a New Zealand resident or if a New Zealand resident makes 
a settlement on the trust. Foreign-sourced income derived by a New Zealand 
resident trustee is exempt income if certain criteria are met.36 The amend-
ments that apply from 27 February 2017 ensure that the foreign trust must 
comply with the increased disclosure obligations in order to be eligible for 
this tax exemption.37 Further discussion of this regime is beyond the scope 
of this report.
One further area where special rules exist relates to new migrants. If a 
person becomes a tax resident in New Zealand, they may qualify for a 
33. Once the NZD 50,000 threshold is exceeded, the FIF rules apply to all FIF interests 
from the rst dollar.
34. See secs. EX 14 and EX 34 ITA 2007.
35. For further details on New Zealand’s foreign trust regime, see subpart HH of the 
ITA 2007 and section 147.
36. See secs. CW 54 and HC 26 ITA 2007.
37. See NZ: Tax Administration Act 1994, secs. 59B-59E [hereinafter TAA 1994], 
Primary Sources IBFD.
474
Chapter 25 - Controlled Foreign Company Legislation in New Zealand
temporary tax exemption on some of their foreign income.38 This exemption 
(which can only be granted once in a lifetime) is available to those who:
– qualify as a tax resident in New Zealand on or after 1 April 2006; and
– are new migrants or returning New Zealanders who have not been resi-
dent for tax purposes in New Zealand for at least 10 years prior to 
qualifying as a tax resident in New Zealand (transitional residents).
The temporary tax exemption for foreign income is for 4 calendar years 
(up to 49 months). It starts on the rst calendar day of the month you qual-
ify as a tax resident in New Zealand and ends on the last calendar day of 
that month 4 years later. The types of foreign income that are temporarily 
exempt from tax in New Zealand incorporates (italics added):39
– CFC income that is attributed under New Zealand’s CFC rules;
– FIF income that is attributed under New Zealand FIF rules (including 
foreign superannuation);
– foreign income subject to non-resident withholding tax or the approved 
issuer (e.g. interest payable on offshore mortgages);
– accrual income (from foreign nancial arrangements);
– income from foreign trusts;
– income derived from rental of offshore property;
– foreign dividends, interest and royalties;
– income connected with employment performed overseas before coming 
to New Zealand, such as bonus payments and from the exercise of 
foreign employee share options;
– gains on the sale of property derived offshore (held on revenue ac-
count); and
– offshore business income (that is not related to the performance of ser-
vices).
25.4. CFC legislation and other anti-abuse provisions
The New Zealand CFC rules are legislatively complex, which reects that 
they are a comprehensive taxing code for all interests New Zealand residents 
have in non-resident companies and similar entities. The revised trust taxa-
tion rules, which came into effect at the same time that the CFC rules did, 
are part of a comprehensive tax reform package including FIF rules. They 
are designed to prevent any substantial deferral of income earned by any 
offshore entity which, from an economic perspective, is owned by a New 
38. See sec. HR 8 ITA 2007.
39. See sec. HR 8 ITA 2007.
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Zealand tax resident. Consequently, the CFC, FIF and trust taxation rules 
all contain a large number of anti-avoidance provisions (found in sections 
GB 7 to GB 16 of the ITA 2007, among others) aimed at specic types of 
tax avoidance strategies that could allow taxpayers to circumvent these three 
sets of rules.
The New Zealand ITA 2007 has a wide-reaching general anti-avoidance rule 
(GAAR) in section BG 1.40 It was held by the Privy Council in Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd41 that an arrangement that 
exploited deciencies in the company tax loss carry-forward rules did not 
preclude the application of the GAAR to negate the advantages sought from 
that arrangement. Thus, compliance with any specic anti-avoidance pro-
vision in the ITA 2007 will not prevent the subsequent application of the 
GAAR, which is almost certain to be the case with the CFC (and related) 
rules. Therefore, the GAAR potentially applies to New Zealand resident’s 
interests in any offshore entity and any arrangement that seeks to obtain 
an unintended tax advantage that was not in the contemplation of the New 
Zealand Parliament.42
25.5. CFC legislation and tax treaties 
It is not proposed to traverse the role of DTAs generally and how they oper-
ate to reduce double taxation. It is well established that their interpretation 
in part follows the guidance in the Vienna Convention43 as well other ap-
proaches to interpretation provided, for example, through the Commentaries 
to the OECD Model44 (assuming this forms the basis of the negotiated 
DTA).45
40. For more information on the New Zealand GAAR, refer to C. Elliffe & A.M.C. 
Smith, Chapter 22: New Zealand in GAARs – A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post-
BEPS Tax World (M. Lang et al. eds., IBFD 2016), Books IBFD.
41. UK: PC, 20 Oct. 1986, Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Challenge Corp. Ltd., 
[1986] NZPC 1.
42. The judicial test that must be applied in considering whether the GAAR applies to an 
arrangement is known as the “parliamentary contemplation test”. This test was established 
by the Supreme Court in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Limited v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, [2009] 2 NZLR 289, and requires a consideration of “whether the impugned 
arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the 
specic provision in a manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose” (at 109).
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) [hereinafter VCLT].
44. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2017) and Commentaries 
on the Articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017).
45. See further M. Lang et al., General Report in CFC Legislation: Domestic Provisions, 
Tax Treaties and EC Law pp. 28-38 (Linde 2004).
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What is of interest is the interplay between the CFC rules and DTAs, espe-
cially with regard to judicial interpretation of this interplay. Until recently, 
the relationship between the CFC rules and tax treaties was reasonably clear 
in New Zealand. Tax treaties could limit the application of the CFC rules 
but in a limited manner. It is unclear how the new Article 1(3) of the OECD 
Model may change this approach. In this regard, it should be noted that 
New Zealand has adopted Article 11 of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) in 
respect of all of its covered tax agreements that conrm the right of a party 
to tax its own residents, which presumably includes CFC rules. CFC rules 
are not listed as one of the exclusions in subsections (a) to (j) of Article 11 
of the MLI.
The interaction between one of New Zealand’s DTAs and the CFC regime 
was the subject of the High Court’s decision in Lin v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue,46 overturned on appeal by the Court of Appeal.47 Of signi-
cance is the fact that the relevant CFC rules in this case were those before 
the introduction of the active income exemption in 2009.
The High Court found that tax relief under the China-New Zealand Double 
Tax Agreement (China DTA)48 is available for tax payable under the CFC 
regime. It also found that New Zealand tax credits are available for tax paid 
by a CFC in China and also for tax spared in China. If this decision stood, 
it would be of wider interest as New Zealand has tax sparing arrangements 
not only with China but also in its DTAs with Fiji, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Vietnam.49 The decision would provide 
guidance on how New Zealand resident taxpayers could qualify for foreign 
tax credits for tax spared in those countries.
The facts concern Ms Lin who was a New Zealand tax resident during 
the period 2005 to 2009 and indirectly held controlling interests in ve 
Chinese companies. Under the New Zealand CFC rules, income earned 
by the Chinese companies was attributed to Ms Lin so she was liable for 
46. NZ: High Court [NZHC], 12 May 2017, Lin v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, 
Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD; [2017] NZHC 969, (2017) 28 NZTC 23-016.
47. Lin (2018), [2018] NZCA 38, (2018) 28 NZTC 23-052.
48. Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (1986, as amended through 1997), 
Treaties & Models IBFD.
49. See Art. 20(3) Fiji-NZ DTA (1977); Art. 23(3) India-NZ DTA (1986); Art. 23(4) Kor. 
Rep.-NZ DTA (1983); Art. 20(3) Malay.-NZ DTA (1976); Art. 22(3) and (4) NZ-Papua 
N. Guin. DTA (2013); Art. 21(3) NZ-Sing. DTA (2013) (in force until 2020 only) and 
Art. 22(3) NZ-Viet. DTA (2014).
477
CFC legislation and tax treaties 
New Zealand tax on this income. This attribution occurred notwithstand-
ing that she never actually received any cash income from the CFCs. The 
income amounted to NZD 4.605 million for which the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (CIR) allowed tax credits of NZD 926,968 for tax paid in 
China by the companies. Under Chinese tax law, these companies were 
also relieved of tax totalling NZD 588,135 (referred to as “tax spared”). If 
this amount was credited against her New Zealand tax liability, Ms Lin’s 
tax liability would have been reduced to approximately NZD 281,000. The 
Commissioner would not allow Ms Lin to claim any tax credits for the tax 
spared. The dispute came before the High Court.
Thomas J, in the High Court, held that the China DTA allows a credit against 
New Zealand tax payable by Ms Lin on her CFC income for Chinese tax 
paid by a CFC and that tax payable in China includes any tax spared amount. 
This decision, if it stood, would reduce Ms Lin’s liability and ensure that 
no penalties would apply. The High Court decision in Lin v. CIR would 
suggest that the courts take a broad pragmatic approach in interpreting tax 
sparing provisions thereby enabling taxpayers to have the opportunity to 
utilize foreign tax credits and reduce their income tax liability accordingly.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal (Harrison, Cooper and Asher JJ) reviewed 
the application and interpretation of Article 23 of the China DTA. In apply-
ing a literal approach to its interpretation of Article 23, the Court of Appeal 
found that the High Court had misconstrued the meaning of the article by 
inferring that the tax relief provided in it extended to both juridical and 
economic double taxation. The Court of Appeal’s decision conrms that 
New Zealand residents will not be entitled to a credit against income tax 
liability in New Zealand for tax spared by China on income earned there by 
companies in which the resident has a relevant income interest. 
Specically, the Court of Appeal reached its decision as follows. The start-
ing point was the CFC regime. This regime was introduced to prevent New 
Zealand residents from deferring or avoiding New Zealand tax by accu-
mulating income in non-resident companies. The Court of Appeal then 
observed that the purpose of the China DTA is to produce revenue reciproc-
ity. That is, one country foregoes some of its income tax rights over source 
or residence taxation in return for the other country foregoing some of the 
same rights. The common economic purpose being to ensure that income is 
taxed only once. The Court of Appeal then considered that the issue should 
be approached by construing the text of Article 23 as a “sequential and 
related whole within its settled context”.
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The Court of Appeal agreed with the CIR’s submission that Article 23(1) 
had the plain purpose of eliminating juridical double taxation in China by 
limiting the entitlement of a resident of that country to a credit on tax actu-
ally paid in New Zealand on income derived there. The Court of Appeal went 
on to note that, while there are linguistic differences between Article 23(1) 
and its companion provision (Article 23(2)(a)), the necessary inference in 
the absence of any contrary intention is that both relieve against juridical 
double taxation. This means that they allow only credits for taxes actually 
paid by a domestic resident in the foreign jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the CIR’s submission that, in terms of 
Article 23(2)(a), the “income” of the CFC was not “derived” by Ms Lin in 
China and the tax paid or spared to the CFC was not payable, paid by or 
spared to Ms Lin. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found that there was no 
scope to import a proposition that the “income derived” refers to the deemed 
or attributed income of the CFC under New Zealand legislation.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High Court’s construction of 
Article 23(3). The High Court determined, that, when read in conjunction 
with Article 23(2)(a), the phrase “payable … by a resident of New Zealand” 
includes tax deemed to have been paid or payable by the New Zealand 
resident on income or tax deemed to have been earned or paid by the New 
Zealand resident through the CFC regime. Rather, the Court of Appeal 
viewed Article 23(3) as conrming the focus of Article 23(2)(a) as being 
on “tax payable in … China by a resident of New Zealand.”
Ms Lin’s argument relied on the phrase “in respect of” where it rst appears 
in Article 23(2)(a) and stated that it should be construed as requiring a con-
nection between tax paid in China and tax payable in New Zealand. The 
Court of Appeal disagreed and said that the phrase “in respect of” is syn-
onymous with “on”. The Court of Appeal was satised that Article 23(2)
(a) requires the tax to have been paid by a New Zealand resident on income 
derived by him in China, not by a third-party CFC.
The Court of Appeal concluded that Article 23(2)(a) relieves solely against 
juridical double taxation. Ms Lin’s argument required the Court to disregard 
the legal nature of the relationship between her and the CFCs. The fact that 
the ultimate source is income attributed to Ms Lin from the Chinese CFCs 
does not justify treating the two income streams (earned separately by her 
and the CFCs) as one for revenue purposes and ignoring the plain founda-
tion of Article 23(2)(a) on the source of “the income derived by a resident 
of New Zealand”.
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The Supreme Court (New Zealand’s highest appellate court) declined to 
grant leave for appeal, being of the view that the arguments were not points 
of sufcient importance to justify the grant of leave and there would be no 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.50 The Court held that the change to the CFC 
regime in 2009 that required the attribution only of the passive income to a 
New Zealand shareholder of a CFC but not the active income signicantly 
affected Ms Lin’s case. This meant that it was unlikely that a CFC would 
ever benet in the future from a tax sparing provision in relation to income 
attributed to it in New Zealand. Furthermore, the Supreme Court also noted 
that there were ongoing negotiations for a new China-New Zealand DTA. 
The Court noted that, even if the new DTA were to allow for tax sparing 
provisions, it anticipated it would be clear what credit should be available 
to a New Zealand tax resident.
The Court of Appeal’s decision thus remains the nal statement on the mat-
ter. Of particular note is that its approach to interpretation of DTAs differs in 
part from that applied in earlier New Zealand decisions and by international 
courts when interpreting international instruments such as DTAs and other 
tax treaties.51 Specically, the court has opted for a more literal approach, 
suggesting that DTAs are to be interpreted according to the same principles 
as those that apply to private contractual instruments and that each DTA 
“must be construed discretely, in accordance with its own particular terms”.52
This approach limits the precedential value of its decision to other New 
Zealand DTAs that contain tax sparing provisions.
The Court of Appeal’s decision conrms that extraneous materials such 
as the OECD and United Nations Commentaries do not have the status 
of legislation. Furthermore, the decision does not directly consider other 
international tax agreements such as tax information exchange agreements 
(TIEAs) with low-tax jurisdictions and the Multilateral Convention regard-
ing information exchange.53
50. NZ: NZSC, Lin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2018] NZSC 54, (2018) 28 
NZTC 23-061.
51. For example: NZ: NZCA, 14 June 1990, Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. JFP 
Energy Inc, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD; [1990] 3 NZLR 536; CA: FCA, 26 Feb. 2009, 
Prevost Car Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD; [2009] FCA 57, 
[2010] 2 FCR 65; AU: High Court of Australia, 22 Aug. 1990, Thiel v. Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD; 88 ATC 4094 (FCA); and NZ: NZHC, 9 June 2016, 
Chateld & Co Ltd v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD; 
[2015] NZHC 2099, (2015) 18 ITLR 392, (2015) 27 NZTC 22-024.
52. Lim (CA), at para. [20].
53. See Double Tax Agreements (Mutual Administrative Assistance) Order 2013.
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25.6. CFC legislation and constitutional law/EU law
New Zealand is not a member of the European Union and thus any EU 
law or directives are not applicable. New Zealand does not have a written 
constitution (similar to the United Kingdom), and thus there are no explicit 
constraints on the New Zealand legislature in enacting tax legislation. None 
of New Zealand’s free trade agreements contain any signicant restriction 
on how it may tax its residents unless some measure has been designed to 
be protectionist and to obstruct foreign trade.
25.7. Improving the current rules
The current CFC rules are a substantial improvement from when they were 
rst introduced in 1988 with the introduction of the active income exemp-
tion in 2009 along with further changes to the complementary FIF rules in 
2011. They are still complex, however, and give rise to substantial compli-
ance costs for affected taxpayers that were made worse by the elimination of 
all countries except Australia from the “grey list”. There is a case to restore 
the grey list to what it was in the 1990s as they included the countries where 
New Zealand businesses were most likely to have set up offshore subsidiar-
ies and the amount of New Zealand tax collectible after granting foreign 
tax credits is low.
A more substantial issue is whether the underlying policy objective of the 
CFC rules should be revised to just target offshore tax avoidance arrange-
ments rather than eliminating deferral on all offshore income. This would 
require a signicant revision to the accompanying FIF rules. As the CFC 
(and FIF) rules are seen by politicians to be highly technical and largely 
the domain of public ofcials, these ofcials have had undue inuence in 
the drafting of them. It would have been ideal if their own views have been 
more inuential on the design of these rules. There is little taxpayer pres-
sure to review the rules and thus no political appetite to revisit them after 
much controversy in their initial enactments (especially with the FIF rules).
25.8. Outlook: The future of CFC legislation
New Zealand itself is of the view that it has robust CFC rules and this is 
something that other jurisdictions should have as well. New Zealand does 
not appear to have a view on whether there should be a global minimum tax. 
Revenue collected from the operation of New Zealand’s CFC legislation is 
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not in itself likely to be signicant, but the absence of such rules would see 
widespread avoidance and, in all likelihood, a signicant reduction in tax 
revenue. The deterrent effect that comes with the CFC rules is important.
New Zealand is of the view that its GAAR is effective for tackling articial 
shifting of income to other countries. In part, this is reected in the CIR’s 
success in litigating cross-border transactions and CFCs, as shown in the 
Lin case and in the Alesco case.54
In some respects, the outlook in terms of CFC legislation in New Zealand 
is one of “wait and see”. In its response to base erosion and prot shifting 
(BEPS),55 the New Zealand government’s view (as advised by ofcials) was 
that New Zealand had robust CFC rules and no changes were necessary 
to accommodate the BEPS Action Plan. Should this prove to be wrong, 
then implementation of necessary legislation would ensue. As at the time of 
writing, the New Zealand government and ofcials have not identied any 
deciencies. That said, ofcials will be monitoring developments from the 
OECD in the light of the implementation of BEPS.
From a judicial interpretation of treaties’ perspectives, the Lin decision, if 
left as it stands, shows that the New Zealand courts have moved some dis-
tance from their well-established position to one in which the interpretation 
of each DTA needs to occur in isolation of any other DTA. In this regard, 
prior judicial decisions will not serve to the same degree as precedents. This 
divergence in approach, in the authors’ view, is unhelpful to New Zealand 
taxpayers seeking to reply on DTAs when it comes to tax sparing (and 
potentially other provisions in the DTAs).
54. NZ: NZCA, 5 Mar. 2013, Alesco NZ v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2013] 
NZCA 40, [2013] 2 NZLR 175, (2013) 26 NZTC 21-003.
55. See, for example, A. Sawyer & R. McGill, The Adoption of BEPS in New Zealand, 
in Tax Design and Administration in a Post-BEPS World: A Study of Key Reform Measures 
in 18 Jurisdictions Chap. 2, pp. 211-228 (Kerrie Sadiq, A. Sawyer and B. McCredie, eds., 
Fiscal Publications 2019).
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Appendix: Article 23 of the China-New Zealand DTA
Article 23
Methods for the elimination of double taxation
1. In China, double taxation shall be eliminated as follows:
Where a resident of China derives income from New Zealand, the 
amount of tax on that income payable in New Zealand, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be credited against the 
Chinese tax imposed on that resident. The amount of credit, however, 
shall not exceed the amount of the Chinese tax on that income com-
puted in accordance with the taxation laws and regulations of China.
2. In the case of New Zealand, double taxation shall be avoided as follows:
a) Subject to any provisions of the laws of New Zealand which may 
from time to time be in force and which relate to the allowance of 
a credit against New Zealand tax of tax paid in a country outside 
New Zealand (which shall not affect the general principle hereof), 
Chinese tax paid under the laws of the People’s Republic of China 
and consistently with this Agreement, whether directly or by de-
duction, in respect of income derived by a resident of New Zealand 
from sources in the People’s Republic of China (excluding, in the 
case of a dividend, tax paid in respect of the prots out of which 
the dividend is paid) shall be allowed as a credit against New 
Zealand tax payable in respect of that income;
b) For the purposes of this Article, income of a resident of New 
Zealand which in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement 
may be taxed in the People’s Republic of China shall be deemed to 
arise from sources in the People’s Republic of China.
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2(a), tax payable in the People’s Republic 
of China by a resident of New Zealand shall be deemed to include any 
amount which would have been payable as Chinese tax for any year but 
for an exemption from, or reduction of tax granted for that year or any 
part thereof under any of the following provisions of Chinese law:
a) Articles 5 and 6 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic 
of China concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign 
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Investment and Article 3 of the Detailed Rules and Regulations for 
the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic 
of China concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign 
Investment;
b) Articles 4 and 5 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic 
of China concerning Foreign Enterprises;
c) Articles I, II, III, IV and X of Part I, Articles I, II, III and IV of Part 
II and Articles I, II and III of Part III of the interim provisions of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China concerning 
reduction or exemption from enterprise income tax in special eco-
nomic zones and coastal cities;
so far as they were in force on, and have not been modied since, the 
date of signature of this Agreement, or have been modied only in 
minor respects so as not to affect their general character; or
d) any other provision which may subsequently be made granting an 
exemption or reduction of tax which is agreed by the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States to be of a substantially similar 
character, if it has not been modied thereafter or has been modi-
ed only in minor respects so as not to affect its general character.
